Cryptanalysis and design of Arithmetization-Oriented primitives



Clémence Bouvier

Seminar CARAMBA, Nancy
December 7th, 2023

RUHR UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM
RUB

Toy example of Zero-Knowledge Proof

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Unsolved Sudoku

Toy example of Zero-Knowledge Proof

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Unsolved Sudoku

4	2	*6*	5	*7*	1	*3*	9	*8*
8	*5*	*7*	2	*9*	3	*1*	*4*	6
1	3	*9*	*4*	6	*8*	*2*	7	*5*
9	*7*	1	*3*	*8*	*5*	6	*2*	*4*
5	4	*3*	*7*	*2*	*6*	*8*	1	9
6	*8*	2	*1*	*4*	*9*	7	*5*	*3*
7	9	*4*	*6*	3	*2*	*5*	8	*1*
2	*6*	*5*	8	*1*	4	*9*	*3*	7
3	1	*8*	9	*5*	7	*4*	6	*2*

Solved Sudoku

Toy example of Zero-Knowledge Proof

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Unsolved Sudoku

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Grid cutting

Toy example of Zero-Knowledge Proof

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Unsolved Sudoku



Rows checking

Toy example of Zero-Knowledge Proof

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Unsolved Sudoku



Columns checking

Toy example of Zero-Knowledge Proof

	2		5		1		9	
8			2		3			6
	3			6			7	
		1				6		
5	4						1	9
		2				7		
	9			3			8	
2			8		4			7
	1		9		7		6	

Unsolved Sudoku



Squares checking

A need for new primitives

Protocols requiring new primitives:

- ⋆ **MPC**: Multiparty Computation
- ⋆ **FHE**: Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- ⋆ **ZK**: Systems of Zero-Knowledge proofs
  Example: SNARKs, STARKs, Bulletproofs



A need for new primitives

Protocols requiring new primitives:

- ⋆ **MPC**: Multiparty Computation
- ⋆ **FHE**: Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- ⋆ **ZK**: Systems of Zero-Knowledge proofs
  Example: SNARKs, STARKs, Bulletproofs



Problem: Designing new symmetric primitives

And analyse their security!

Block ciphers

- input: n-bit block

$$x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$$

- parameter: k-bit key

$$\kappa \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$$

- output: n-bit block

$$y = E_\kappa(x) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$$

- symmetry: E and E^{-1} use the same κ



(a) *Block cipher* **(b)** *Random permutation*

Block ciphers

- input: n-bit block

$$x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$$

- parameter: k-bit key

$$\kappa \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$$

- output: n-bit block

$$y = E_\kappa(x) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$$

- symmetry: E and E^{-1} use the same κ



(a) *Block cipher*



(b) *Random permutation*

A block cipher is a family of 2^k permutations of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$.



Iterated constructions

How to build an efficient block cipher?

By iterating a round function.



Comparison with the traditional case

Traditional case

$$y \leftarrow E(x)$$



Arithmetization-oriented

$$y \leftarrow E(x) \quad \text{and} \quad y == E(x)$$



Comparison with the traditional case

Traditional case

$$y \leftarrow E(x)$$

⋆ Optimized for:
implementation in software/hardware

Arithmetization-oriented

$$y \leftarrow E(x) \quad \text{and} \quad y == E(x)$$

⋆ Optimized for:
integration within advanced protocols

Comparison with the traditional case

Traditional case

$$y \leftarrow E(x)$$

- Optimized for:
  implementation in software/hardware
- Alphabet size:
  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, with $n \simeq 4, 8$

  Ex: Field of AES: $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ where $n = 8$

Arithmetization-oriented

$$y \leftarrow E(x) \quad \text{and} \quad y == E(x)$$

- Optimized for:
  integration within advanced protocols
- Alphabet size:
  $\mathbb{F}_q$, with $q \in \{2^n, p\}, p \simeq 2^n$, $n \geq 64$

  Ex: Scalar Field of Curve `BLS12-381`: $\mathbb{F}_p$ where

  $p =$ `0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d805`
  `53bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001`

Comparison with the traditional case

Traditional case

$$y \leftarrow E(x)$$

- Optimized for:
  implementation in software/hardware
- Alphabet size:
  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, with $n \simeq 4, 8$
- Operations:
  logical gates/CPU instructions

Arithmetization-oriented

$$y \leftarrow E(x) \quad \text{and} \quad y == E(x)$$

- Optimized for:
  integration within advanced protocols
- Alphabet size:
  $\mathbb{F}_q$, with $q \in \{2^n, p\}, p \simeq 2^n$, $n \geq 64$
- Operations:
  large finite-field arithmetic

Comparison with the traditional case

Traditional case

$$y \leftarrow E(x)$$

⋆ Optimized for:
imple… hardware

… size:
…$_2$, with $n \simeq 4, 8$

⋆ Operations:
logical gates/CPU instructions

Decades of Cryptanalysis

Arithmetization-oriented

$$y \leftarrow E(x) \quad \text{and} \quad y == E(x)$$

⋆ Optimized for:
integration … protocols

… with $q \in \{2^n, p\}, p \simeq 2^n, n \geq 64$.

⋆ Operations:
large finite-field arithmetic

$\leq$ 5 years of Cryptanalysis

Overview of the contributions

Design

Introducing the link between CCZ-equivalence and Arithmetization-Orientation → Designing a new S-Box: the `Flystel`

Designing a new compression mode for Merkle trees: `Jive` → Designing a new family of ZK-friendly hash functions: `Anemoi`

Cryptanalysis

Overview of the contributions

Design

Introducing the link between CCZ-equivalence and Arithmetization-Orientation → Designing a new S-Box: the `Flystel`

Designing a new compression mode for Merkle trees: `Jive` → Designing a new family of ZK-friendly hash functions: `Anemoi`

Cryptanalysis

Study of algebraic attacks against some Arithmetization-Oriented primitives

Overview of the contributions

Design

Introducing the link between CCZ-equivalence and Arithmetization-Orientation → Designing a new S-Box: the `Flystel`

Designing a new compression mode for Merkle trees: `Jive` → Designing a new family of ZK-friendly hash functions: `Anemoi`

Cryptanalysis

Study of algebraic attacks against some Arithmetization-Oriented primitives

Study of the univariate polynomial representation of MiMC → Finding bounds on the algebraic degree of MiMC

Tracing maximum-weight exponents to reach the upper bound on the algebraic degree of MiMC

Investigating various open problems to better understand the behaviour of the algebraic degree

Overview of the contributions

Design

New Design Techniques for Efficient Arithmetization-Oriented Hash Functions: Anemoi Permutations and Jive Compression Mode, Bouvier, Briaud, Chaidos, Perrin, Salen, Velichkov, Willems, **CRYPTO 2023**

Cryptanalysis

Algebraic attacks against some arithmetization-oriented primitives, Bariant, Bouvier, Leurent, Perrin, **ToSC, 2022**

On the algebraic degree of iterated power functions, Bouvier, Canteaut, Perrin, **DCC, 2023**

Coefficient Grouping for Complex Affine Layers, Lui, Grassi, Bouvier, Meier, Isobe, **CRYPTO 2023**

Overview of the contributions

Design

New Design Techniques for Efficient Arithmetization-Oriented Hash Functions: Anemoi Permutations and Jive Compression Mode, Bouvier, Briaud, Chaidos, Perrin, Salen, Velichkov, Willems, **CRYPTO 2023**

Cryptanalysis

On the algebraic degree of iterated power functions, Bouvier, Canteaut, Perrin, **DCC, 2023**

Design of Anemoi

- Link between CCZ-equivalence and Arithmetization-Orientation
- A new S-Box: the Flystel
- A new family of ZK-friendly hash functions: Anemoi

Performance metric

What does "efficient" mean for Zero-Knowledge Proofs?

Performance metric

What does "efficient" mean for Zero-Knowledge Proofs?

"It depends"

Performance metric

What does "efficient" mean for Zero-Knowledge Proofs?

"It depends"

Example

R1CS (Rank-1 Constraint System): minimizing the number of multiplications

$$y = (ax + b)^3 (cx + d) + ex$$

$t_0 = a \cdot x$	$t_3 = t_2 \times t_1$	$t_6 = t_3 \times t_5$
$t_1 = t_0 + b$	$t_4 = c \cdot x$	$t_7 = e \cdot x$
$t_2 = t_1 \times t_1$	$t_5 = t_4 + d$	$t_8 = t_6 + t_7$

Performance metric

What does "efficient" mean for Zero-Knowledge Proofs?

"It depends"

Example

R1CS (Rank-1 Constraint System): minimizing the number of multiplications

$$y = (ax+b)^3(cx+d)+ex$$

$t_0 = a \cdot x$	$t_3 = t_2 \times t_1$	$t_6 = t_3 \times t_5$
$t_1 = t_0 + b$	$t_4 = c \cdot x$	$t_7 = e \cdot x$
$t_2 = t_1 \times t_1$	$t_5 = t_4 + d$	$t_8 = t_6 + t_7$

3 constraints

Our approach

Need: verification using few multiplications.

Our approach

Need: verification using few multiplications.

⋆ **First approach:** evaluation using few multiplications, e.g. Poseidon [Grassi et al., USENIX21]

$\boxed{y \leftarrow E(x)}$ $\rightsquigarrow E$: low degree

$\boxed{y == E(x)}$ $\rightsquigarrow E$: low degree

Our approach

Need: verification using few multiplications.

⋆ **First approach:** evaluation using few multiplications, e.g. Poseidon [Grassi et al., USENIX21]

$\boxed{y \leftarrow E(x)}$ $\leadsto$ E: low degree

$\boxed{y == E(x)}$ $\leadsto$ E: low degree

⋆ **First breakthrough:** using inversion, e.g. *Rescue* [Aly et al., ToSC20]

$\boxed{y \leftarrow E(x)}$ $\leadsto$ E: high degree

$\boxed{x == E^{-1}(y)}$ $\leadsto$ E^{-1}: low degree

Our approach

Need: verification using few multiplications.

⋆ **First approach:** evaluation using few multiplications, e.g. POSEIDON [Grassi et al., USENIX21]

$\boxed{y \leftarrow E(x)}$ $\rightsquigarrow$ E: low degree

$\boxed{y == E(x)}$ $\rightsquigarrow$ E: low degree

⋆ **First breakthrough:** using inversion, e.g. *Rescue* [Aly et al., ToSC20]

$\boxed{y \leftarrow E(x)}$ $\rightsquigarrow$ E: high degree

$\boxed{x == E^{-1}(y)}$ $\rightsquigarrow$ E^{-1}: low degree

⋆ **Our approach:** using $(u, v) = \mathcal{L}(x, y)$, where $\mathcal{L}$ is linear

$\boxed{y \leftarrow F(x)}$ $\rightsquigarrow$ F: high degree

$\boxed{v == G(u)}$ $\rightsquigarrow$ G: low degree

CCZ-equivalence

Inversion

$$\Gamma_F = \{(x, F(x)), x \in \mathbb{F}_q\} \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma_{F^{-1}} = \left\{\left(y, F^{-1}(y)\right), y \in \mathbb{F}_q\right\}$$

Noting that

$$\Gamma_F = \left\{\left(F^{-1}(y), y\right), y \in \mathbb{F}_q\right\} ,$$

then, we have:

$$\Gamma_F = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \Gamma_{F^{-1}} .$$

CCZ-equivalence

Inversion

$$\Gamma_F = \{(x, F(x)), x \in \mathbb{F}_q\} \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma_{F^{-1}} = \left\{\left(y, F^{-1}(y)\right), y \in \mathbb{F}_q\right\}$$

Noting that

$$\Gamma_F = \left\{\left(F^{-1}(y), y\right), y \in \mathbb{F}_q\right\} \ ,$$

then, we have:

$$\Gamma_F = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \Gamma_{F^{-1}} \ .$$

Definition [Carlet, Charpin and Zinoviev, DCC98]

$F : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ and $G : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ are **CCZ-equivalent** if

$$\Gamma_F \ = \ \mathcal{L}(\Gamma_G) + c \ , \quad \text{where } \mathcal{L} \text{ is linear.}$$

Advantages of CCZ-equivalence

If $F : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $G : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ are **CCZ-equivalent**. Then

⋆ Differential properties are the same: $\delta_F = \delta_G$.

Differential uniformity

Maximum value of the DDT

$$\delta_F = \max_{a \neq 0, b} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_q^m, F(x+a) - F(x) = b\}|$$

Advantages of CCZ-equivalence

If $F : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $G : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ are **CCZ-equivalent**. Then

⋆ Differential properties are the same: $\delta_F = \delta_G$.

Differential uniformity

Maximum value of the DDT

$$\delta_F = \max_{a \neq 0, b} \left| \{ x \in \mathbb{F}_q^m, F(x+a) - F(x) = b \} \right|$$

⋆ Linear properties are the same: $\mathcal{W}_F = \mathcal{W}_G$.

Linearity

Maximum value of the LAT

$$\mathcal{W}_F = \max_{a, b \neq 0} \left| \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^m} (-1)^{a \cdot x + b \cdot F(x)} \right|$$

Advantages of CCZ-equivalence

If $F : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ and $G : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ are **CCZ-equivalent**. Then

- ⋆ Verification is the same: if $y \leftarrow F(x)$, $v \leftarrow G(u)$ and $(u, v) = \mathcal{L}(x, y)$

$$y == F(x)? \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad v == G(u)?$$

Advantages of CCZ-equivalence

If $F : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $G : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ are **CCZ-equivalent**. Then

- ⋆ Verification is the same: if $y \leftarrow F(x)$, $v \leftarrow G(u)$ and $(u, v) = \mathcal{L}(x, y)$

$$y == F(x)? \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad v == G(u)?$$

- ⋆ The degree is **not preserved**.

Example

in $\mathbb{F}_p$ where

$$p = \texttt{0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d80553bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001}$$

if $F(x) = x^5$ then $F^{-1}(x) = x^{5^{-1}}$ where

$$5^{-1} = \texttt{0x2e5f0fbadd72321ce14a56699d73f002217f0e679998f19933333332cccccccd}$$

Advantages of CCZ-equivalence

If $F : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $G : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ are **CCZ-equivalent**. Then

- Verification is the same: if $y \leftarrow F(x)$, $v \leftarrow G(u)$ and $(u, v) = \mathcal{L}(x, y)$

$$\boxed{y == F(x)? \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad v == G(u)?}$$

- The degree is **not preserved**.

Example

in $\mathbb{F}_p$ where

$$p = \texttt{0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d80553bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001}$$

if $F(x) = x^5$ then $F^{-1}(x) = x^{5^{-1}}$ where

$$5^{-1} = \texttt{0x2e5f0fbadd72321ce14a56699d73f002217f0e679998f19933333332cccccccd}$$

The Flystel

Butterfly + Feistel ⇒ Flystel

A 3-round Feistel-network with
$Q_\gamma : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $Q_\delta : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ two quadratic functions, and $E : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ a permutation

High-Degree permutation



Open Flystel $\mathcal{H}$.

Low-Degree function



Closed Flystel $\mathcal{V}$.

The Flystel

$\boxed{\text{Butterfly} + \text{Feistel} \Rightarrow \texttt{Flystel}}$

A 3-round Feistel-network with
$Q_\gamma : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ and $Q_\delta : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ two quadratic functions, and $E : \mathbb{F}_q \to \mathbb{F}_q$ a permutation

High-Degree permutation



Open `Flystel` $\mathcal{H}$.

Low-Degree function



Closed `Flystel` $\mathcal{V}$.

$$\Gamma_{\mathcal{H}} = \mathcal{L}(\Gamma_{\mathcal{V}}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad ((x, y), (u, v)) = \mathcal{L}\left(((v, y), (x, u)) \right)$$

Advantage of CCZ-equivalence

⋆ High-Degree Evaluation.

High-Degree
permutation



Open `Flystel` $\mathcal{H}$.

Example

if $E : x \mapsto x^5$ in $\mathbb{F}_p$ where

$$p = \texttt{0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d805}$$
$$\texttt{53bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001}$$

then $E^{-1} : x \mapsto x^{5^{-1}}$ where

$$5^{-1} = \texttt{0x2e5f0fbadd72321ce14a56699d73f002}$$
$$\texttt{217f0e679998f19933333332cccccccd}$$

Advantage of CCZ-equivalence

- ⋆ High-Degree Evaluation.
- ⋆ Low-Degree Verification.

$$\boxed{(u, v) == \mathcal{H}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (x, u) == \mathcal{V}(y, v)}$$

High-Degree permutation



Open `Flystel` $\mathcal{H}$.

Low-Degree function



Closed `Flystel` $\mathcal{V}$.

Flystel in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, n odd

$$Q_\gamma(x) = \gamma + \beta x^3 , \quad Q_\delta(x) = \delta + \beta x^3 , \quad \text{and} \quad E(x) = x^3$$



Open Flystel$_2$.



Closed Flystel$_2$.

Properties of `Flystel` in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, n odd



Degenerated Butterfly.

Introduced by [Perrin et al. 2016].

Theorems in [Li et al. 2018] state that if $\beta \neq 0$:

- ⋆ Differential properties

$$\delta_{\mathcal{H}} = \delta_{\mathcal{V}} = 4$$

- ⋆ Linear properties

$$\mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{H}} = \mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{V}} = 2^{n+1}$$

- ⋆ Algebraic degree
  - ⋆ Open `Flystel`$_2$: $\deg_{\mathcal{H}} = n$
  - ⋆ Closed `Flystel`$_2$: $\deg_{\mathcal{V}} = 2$

Flystel in $\mathbb{F}_p$

$$Q_\gamma(x) = \gamma + \beta x^2 \;, \quad Q_\delta(x) = \delta + \beta x^2 \;, \quad \text{and} \quad E(x) = x^d$$



Open $\texttt{Flystel}_p$.

usually
$d = 3$ or 5.



Closed $\texttt{Flystel}_p$.

Properties of Flystel in $\mathbb{F}_p$

⋆ Differential properties

$\texttt{Flystel}_\texttt{p}$ has a differential uniformity:

$$\delta_{\mathcal{H}} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_p^2, \mathcal{H}(x + a) - \mathcal{H}(x) = b\}| \leq d - 1$$

Properties of Flystel in $\mathbb{F}_p$

⋆ Differential properties

$\texttt{Flystel}_\texttt{p}$ has a differential uniformity:

$$\delta_{\mathcal{H}} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_p^2, \mathcal{H}(x + a) - \mathcal{H}(x) = b\}| \leq d - 1$$

Solving the open problem of finding an APN (Almost-Perfect Non-linear) permutation over $\mathbb{F}_p^2$

Properties of Flystel in $\mathbb{F}_p$

⋆ Differential properties

$\texttt{Flystel}_\texttt{p}$ has a differential uniformity:

$$\delta_{\mathcal{H}} = \max_{a \neq 0, b} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_p^2, \mathcal{H}(x+a) - \mathcal{H}(x) = b\}| \leq d - 1$$

Solving the open problem of finding an APN (Almost-Perfect Non-linear) permutation over $\mathbb{F}_p^2$

⋆ Linear properties

Conjecture:

$$\mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{H}} = \max_{a, b \neq 0} \left| \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_p^2} exp\left(\frac{2\pi i(\langle a, x\rangle - \langle b, \mathcal{H}(x)\rangle)}{p}\right) \right| \leq p \log p \ ?$$

The SPN Structure

The internal state of `Anemoi` and its basic operations.

A Substitution-Permutation Network with:

(a) *Internal state.*



(b) *The constant addition.*



(c) *The diffusion layer.*



(d) *The Pseudo-Hadamard Transform.*



(e) *The S-box layer.*

The SPN Structure



The SPN Structure



The SPN Structure



The SPN Structure



Number of rounds

$$\boxed{\texttt{Anemoi}_{q,d,\ell} = \mathcal{M} \circ \mathsf{R}_{n_r-1} \circ \ldots \circ \mathsf{R}_0}$$

⋆ Choosing the number of rounds

$$n_r \geq \max\left\{ 8 \,,\, \underbrace{\min(5, 1+\ell)}_{\text{security margin}} + \underbrace{2 + \min\left\{ r \in \mathbb{N} \;\middle|\; \binom{4\ell r + \kappa_d}{2\ell r}^2 \geq 2^s \right\}}_{\text{to prevent algebraic attacks}} \right\} .$$

d (κ_d)	3 (1)	5 (2)	7 (4)	11 (9)
$\ell = 1$	21	21	20	19
$\ell = 2$	14	14	13	13
$\ell = 3$	12	12	12	11
$\ell = 4$	12	12	11	11

Number of rounds of `Anemoi` *($s = 128$).*

Performance metric

What does "efficient" mean for Zero-Knowledge Proofs?

"It depends"

Example

R1CS (Rank-1 Constraint System): minimizing the number of multiplications

$$y = (ax + b)^3(cx + d) + ex$$

$t_0 = a \cdot x$	$t_3 = t_2 \times t_1$	$t_6 = t_3 \times t_5$
$t_1 = t_0 + b$	$t_4 = c \cdot x$	$t_7 = e \cdot x$
$t_2 = t_1 \times t_1$	$t_5 = t_4 + d$	$t_8 = t_6 + t_7$

3 constraints

Some Benchmarks

	m $(=2\ell)$	RP[1]	Poseidon[2]	Griffin[3]	Anemoi
R1CS	2	208	198	-	**76**
	4	224	232	112	**96**
	6	216	264	-	**120**
	8	256	296	176	**160**
Plonk	2	312	380	-	**191**
	4	560	832	**260**	316
	6	756	1344	-	**460**
	8	1152	1920	**574**	648
AIR	2	156	300	-	**126**
	4	**168**	348	**168**	**168**
	6	**162**	396	-	216
	8	**192**	456	264	288

(a) *when* $d=3$.

	m $(=2\ell)$	RP	Poseidon	Griffin	Anemoi
R1CS	2	240	216	-	**95**
	4	264	264	**110**	120
	6	288	315	-	**150**
	8	384	363	**162**	200
Plonk	2	320	344	-	**212**
	4	528	696	**222**	344
	6	768	1125	-	**496**
	8	1280	1609	**492**	696
AIR	2	**200**	360	-	210
	4	**220**	440	**220**	280
	6	**240**	540	-	360
	8	**320**	640	360	480

(b) *when* $d=5$.

Constraint comparison for standard arithmetization, without optimization ($s=128$).

[1] *Rescue* [Aly et al., ToSC20]
[2] Poseidon [Grassi et al., USENIX21]
[3] Griffin [Grassi et al., CRYPTO23]

Take-Away

Anemoi: A new family of ZK-friendly hash functions

- ⋆ Identify a link between AO and CCZ-equivalence
- ⋆ Contributions of fundamental interest:
  - ⋆ New S-box: Flystel
  - ⋆ New mode: Jive

Take-Away

Anemoi: A new family of ZK-friendly hash functions

- Identify a link between AO and CCZ-equivalence
- Contributions of fundamental interest:
  - New S-box: Flystel
  - New mode: Jive

Related works

- $\texttt{AnemoiJive}_3$ with TurboPlonK [Liu et al., 2022]
- Arion [Roy, Steiner and Trevisani, 2023]
- APN permutations over prime fields [Budaghyan and Pal, 2023]

Cryptanalysis of MIMC

- Study of the corresponding sparse univariate polynomials
- Bounding the algebraic degree
- Tracing maximum-weight exponents reaching the upper bound
- Study of higher-order differential attacks

The block cipher MiMC

- Minimize the number of multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.
- Construction of MiMC_3 [Albrecht et al., AC16]:
  - n-bit blocks (n odd ≈ 129): $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$
  - n-bit key: $k \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$
  - decryption : replacing x^3 by x^s where $s = (2^{n+1} - 1)/3$



The block cipher MiMC

- Minimize the number of multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.
- Construction of MiMC_3 [Albrecht et al., AC16]:
  - n-bit blocks (n odd ≈ 129): $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$
  - n-bit key: $k \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$
  - decryption : replacing x^3 by x^s where $s = (2^{n+1} - 1)/3$

$$r := \lceil n \log_3 2 \rceil \ .$$

n	129	255	769	1025
r	82	161	486	647

Number of rounds for MiMC.



The block cipher MiMC

- Minimize the number of multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.
- Construction of MiMC$_3$ [Albrecht et al., AC16]:
  - n-bit blocks (n odd ≈ 129): $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$
  - n-bit key: $k \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$
  - decryption : replacing x^3 by x^s where $s = (2^{n+1} - 1)/3$

$$r := \lceil n \log_3 2 \rceil .$$

n	129	255	769	1025
r	82	161	486	647

Number of rounds for MiMC.



Algebraic degree - 1st definition

Let $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$, there is **a unique multivariate polynomial** in $\mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \ldots x_n]/\left((x_i^2 + x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}\right)$:

$$f(x_1, ..., x_n) = \sum_{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} a_u x^u, \text{ where } a_u \in \mathbb{F}_2, \; x^u = \prod_{i=1}^{n} x_i^{u_i} \; .$$

This is the **Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)** of f.

Definition

Algebraic degree of $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$:

$$\deg^a(f) = \max \left\{ \mathrm{wt}(u) : u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n, a_u \neq 0 \right\} \; .$$

Algebraic degree - 1st definition

Let $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$, there is **a unique multivariate polynomial** in $\mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \ldots x_n]/\left((x_i^2 + x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}\right)$:

$$f(x_1, ..., x_n) = \sum_{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} a_u x^u, \text{ where } a_u \in \mathbb{F}_2, \; x^u = \prod_{i=1}^{n} x_i^{u_i} .$$

This is the **Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)** of f.

Definition

Algebraic degree of $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$:

$$\deg^a(f) = \max \left\{ \mathrm{wt}(u) : u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n, a_u \neq 0 \right\} .$$

If $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$, with $F(x) = (f_1(x), \ldots f_m(x))$, then

$$\deg^a(F) = \max\{\deg^a(f_i), \; 1 \le i \le m\} .$$

Algebraic degree - 1st definition

Let $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$, there is **a unique multivariate polynomial** in $\mathbb{F}_2[x_1, \ldots x_n] / \left((x_i^2 + x_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n}\right)$:

$$f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \sum_{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} a_u x^u, \text{ where } a_u \in \mathbb{F}_2, \; x^u = \prod_{i=1}^{n} x_i^{u_i} \; .$$

This is the **Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)** of f.

Example: ANF of $x \mapsto x^3$ in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{11}}$

$$\begin{aligned}
&(x_0x_{10} + x_0 + x_1x_5 + x_1x_9 + x_2x_7 + x_2x_9 + x_2x_{10} + x_3x_4 + x_3x_5 + x_4x_8 + x_4x_9 + x_5x_{10} + x_6x_7 + x_6x_{10} + x_7x_8 + x_9x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_1 + x_0x_6 + x_2x_5 + x_2x_8 + x_3x_6 + x_3x_9 + x_3x_{10} + x_4 + x_5x_8 + x_5x_9 + x_6x_9 + x_7x_8 + x_7x_9 + x_7 + x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_1 + x_0x_2 + x_0x_{10} + x_1x_5 + x_1x_6 + x_1x_9 + x_2x_7 + x_3x_4 + x_3x_7 + x_4x_5 + x_4x_8 + x_4x_{10} + x_5x_{10} + x_6x_7 + x_6x_8 + x_6x_9 + x_7x_{10} + x_8 + x_9x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_3 + x_0x_6 + x_0x_7 + x_1 + x_2x_5 + x_2x_6 + x_2x_8 + x_2x_{10} + x_3x_6 + x_3x_8 + x_3x_9 + x_4x_5 + x_4x_6 + x_4 + x_5x_8 + x_5x_{10} + x_6x_9 + x_7x_9 + x_7 + x_8x_9 + x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_2 + x_0x_4 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_6 + x_1x_7 + x_2x_9 + x_2x_{10} + x_3x_5 + x_3x_6 + x_3x_7 + x_3x_9 + x_4x_5 + x_4x_7 + x_4x_9 + x_5 + x_6x_8 + x_7x_8 + x_8x_9 + x_8x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_5 + x_0x_7 + x_0x_8 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_6 + x_2x_7 + x_2x_{10} + x_3x_8 + x_4x_5 + x_4x_8 + x_5x_6 + x_5x_9 + x_7x_8 + x_7x_9 + x_7x_{10} + x_9, \\
&x_0x_3 + x_0x_6 + x_1x_4 + x_1x_7 + x_1x_8 + x_2 + x_3x_6 + x_3x_7 + x_3x_9 + x_4x_7 + x_4x_9 + x_4x_{10} + x_5x_6 + x_5x_7 + x_5 + x_6x_9 + x_7x_{10} + x_8x_{10} + x_8 + x_9x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_7 + x_0x_8 + x_0x_9 + x_1x_3 + x_1x_5 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_7 + x_2x_8 + x_3x_{10} + x_4x_6 + x_4x_7 + x_4x_8 + x_4x_{10} + x_5x_6 + x_5x_8 + x_5x_{10} + x_6 + x_7x_9 + x_8x_9 + x_9x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_4 + x_0x_8 + x_1x_6 + x_1x_8 + x_1x_9 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_7 + x_3x_8 + x_4x_9 + x_5x_6 + x_5x_9 + x_6x_7 + x_6x_{10} + x_8x_9 + x_8x_{10} + x_{10}, \\
&x_0x_{10} + x_1x_4 + x_1x_7 + x_2x_5 + x_2x_8 + x_2x_9 + x_3 + x_4x_7 + x_4x_8 + x_4x_{10} + x_5x_8 + x_5x_{10} + x_6x_7 + x_6x_8 + x_6 + x_7x_{10} + x_9, \\
&x_0x_5 + x_0x_{10} + x_1x_8 + x_1x_9 + x_1x_{10} + x_2x_4 + x_2x_6 + x_3x_4 + x_3x_8 + x_3x_9 + x_5x_7 + x_5x_8 + x_5x_9 + x_6x_7 + x_6x_9 + x_7 + x_8x_{10} + x_9x_{10}) \; .
\end{aligned}$$

Algebraic degree - 2nd definition

Let $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Then using the isomorphism $\mathbb{F}_2^n \simeq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$,
there is **a unique univariate polynomial representation** on $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ of degree at most $2^n - 1$:

$$F(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} b_i x^i ; b_i \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$$

Proposition

Algebraic degree of $F : \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$:

$$\deg^a(F) = \max\{\mathrm{wt}(i),\ 0 \leq i < 2^n, \text{ and } \ b_i \neq 0\}$$

Algebraic degree - 2nd definition

Let $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Then using the isomorphism $\mathbb{F}_2^n \simeq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, there is **a unique univariate polynomial representation** on $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ of degree at most $2^n - 1$:

$$F(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} b_i x^i ; b_i \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$$

Proposition

Algebraic degree of $F : \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$:

$$\deg^a(F) = \max\{\mathrm{wt}(i),\ 0 \leq i < 2^n, \text{ and } \ b_i \neq 0\}$$

If $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is a permutation, then

$$\boxed{\deg^a(F) \leq n - 1}$$

Higher-Order differential attacks

Exploiting a low algebraic degree

For any affine subspace $\mathcal{V} \subset \mathbb{F}_2^n$ with $\dim \mathcal{V} \geq \deg^a(F) + 1$, we have a 0-sum distinguisher:

$$\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{V}} F(x) = 0.$$

Random permutation: degree $= n - 1$

Higher-Order differential attacks

Exploiting a low algebraic degree

For any affine subspace $\mathcal{V} \subset \mathbb{F}_2^n$ with $\dim \mathcal{V} \geq \deg^a(F) + 1$, we have a 0-sum distinguisher:

$$\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{V}} F(x) = 0.$$

Random permutation: degree $= n - 1$



(a) *Block cipher*



(b) *Random permutation*



First Plateau

Polynomial representing r rounds of MIMC_3:

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,r}(x) = F_r \circ \ldots F_1(x) \ , \ \text{where } F_i = (x + c_{i-1})^3 \ .$$

Upper bound [Eichlseder et al., AC20]:

$$\lceil r \log_2 3 \rceil \ .$$

Aim: determine

$$B_3^r := \max_c \deg^a(\mathcal{P}_{3,r}) \ .$$

First Plateau

Polynomial representing r rounds of MIMC$_3$:

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,r}(x) = F_r \circ \ldots F_1(x) \text{ , where } F_i = (x + c_{i-1})^3 \text{ .}$$

Upper bound [Eichlseder et al., AC20]:

$$\lceil r \log_2 3 \rceil \text{ .}$$

Aim: determine

$$B_3^r := \max_c \deg^a(\mathcal{P}_{3,r}) \text{ .}$$

Example

- Round 1: $B_3^1 = 2$

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,1}(x) = x^3$$

$$3 = [11]_2$$

First Plateau

Polynomial representing r rounds of MIMC_3:

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,r}(x) = F_r \circ \ldots F_1(x) \ , \ \text{where } F_i = (x + c_{i-1})^3 \ .$$

Upper bound [Eichlseder et al., AC20]:

$$\lceil r \log_2 3 \rceil \ .$$

Aim: determine

$$B_3^r := \max_c \deg^a(\mathcal{P}_{3,r}) \ .$$

Example

- Round 1: $B_3^1 = 2$

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,1}(x) = x^3$$

$$3 = [11]_2$$

- Round 2: $B_3^2 = 2$

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,2}(x) = x^9 + c_1 x^6 + c_1^2 x^3 + c_1^3$$

$$9 = [1001]_2 \ 6 = [110]_2 \ 3 = [11]_2$$

Observed degree

Definition

There is a **plateau** between rounds r and $r+1$ whenever:

$$B_3^{r+1} = B_3^r \ .$$

Proposition

If $d = 2^j - 1$, there is always **plateau** between rounds 1 and 2:

$$B_d^2 = B_d^1 \ .$$

Observed degree

Definition

There is a **plateau** between rounds r and $r+1$ whenever:

$$B_3^{r+1} = B_3^r \ .$$

Proposition

If $d = 2^j - 1$, there is always **plateau** between rounds 1 and 2:

$$B_d^2 = B_d^1 \ .$$



Algebraic degree observed for $n = 31$.

Missing exponents

Proposition

Set of exponents that might appear in the polynomial:

$$\mathcal{E}_{3,r} = \{3 \times j \bmod (2^n - 1) \text{ where } j \text{ is covered by } i, \; i \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r-1}\}$$

Missing exponents

Proposition

Set of exponents that might appear in the polynomial:

$$\mathcal{E}_{3,r} = \{3 \times j \bmod (2^n - 1) \text{ where } j \text{ is covered by } i, \ i \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r-1}\}$$

Example

$$\mathcal{P}_{3,1}(x) = x^3 \quad \text{so} \quad \mathcal{E}_{3,1} = \{3\} \ .$$

$$3 = [11]_2 \quad \xrightarrow{\text{cover}} \quad \begin{cases} [00]_2 = 0 & \xrightarrow{\times 3} \quad 0 \\ [01]_2 = 1 & \xrightarrow{\times 3} \quad 3 \\ [10]_2 = 2 & \xrightarrow{\times 3} \quad 6 \\ [11]_2 = 3 & \xrightarrow{\times 3} \quad 9 \end{cases}$$

$$\mathcal{E}_{3,2} = \{0, 3, 6, 9\} \ , \quad \text{indeed} \quad \mathcal{P}_{3,2}(x) = x^9 + c_1 x^6 + c_1^2 x^3 + c_1^3 \ .$$

Missing exponents

Proposition

Set of exponents that might appear in the polynomial:

$$\mathcal{E}_{3,r} = \{3 \times j \bmod (2^n - 1) \text{ where } j \text{ is covered by } i,\ i \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r-1}\}$$

Missing exponents: no exponent $2^{2k} - 1$

Proposition

$$\forall i \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r}, i \not\equiv 5, 7 \bmod 8$$

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63

Representation exponents.



Missing exponents mod8.

Bounding the degree

Theorem

After r rounds of MIMC_3, the algebraic degree is

$$B_3^r \leq 2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil$$

Bounding the degree

Theorem

After r rounds of MIMC_3, the algebraic degree is

$$B_3^r \leq 2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil$$

If $3^r < 2^n - 1$:

- A lower bound

$$B_3^r \geq \max\{\mathrm{wt}(3^i), i \leq r\}$$

- **Upper bound reached for almost 16265 rounds**



Tracing exponents

3

Round 1

Tracing exponents



Tracing exponents



Tracing exponents



Tracing exponents



Tracing exponents



Tracing exponents



Exact degree

Maximum-weight exponents:

Let $k_r = \lfloor \log_2 3^r \rfloor$.

$\forall r \in \{4, \dots, 16265\} \backslash \mathcal{F}$ with $\mathcal{F} = \{465, 571, \dots\}$:

- if $k_r = 1 \mod 2$,
$$\omega_r = 2^{k_r} - 5 \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r},$$
- if $k_r = 0 \mod 2$,
$$\omega_r = 2^{k_r} - 7 \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r}.$$

Exact degree

Maximum-weight exponents:

Let $k_r = \lfloor \log_2 3^r \rfloor$.

$\forall r \in \{4, \ldots, 16265\} \backslash \mathcal{F}$ with $\mathcal{F} = \{465, 571, \ldots\}$:

- ⋆ if $k_r = 1 \bmod 2$,

$$\omega_r = 2^{k_r} - 5 \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r},$$

- ⋆ if $k_r = 0 \bmod 2$,

$$\omega_r = 2^{k_r} - 7 \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r}.$$



Constructing exponents.

Exact degree

Maximum-weight exponents:

Let $k_r = \lfloor \log_2 3^r \rfloor$.

$\forall r \in \{4, \ldots, 16265\} \backslash \mathcal{F}$ with $\mathcal{F} = \{465, 571, \ldots\}$:

- ⋆ if $k_r = 1 \bmod 2$,

$$\omega_r = 2^{k_r} - 5 \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r},$$

- ⋆ if $k_r = 0 \bmod 2$,

$$\omega_r = 2^{k_r} - 7 \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r}.$$



Constructing exponents.

$$\boxed{\text{In most cases,} \quad \exists\, \ell \text{ s.t.} \quad \omega_{r-\ell} \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r-\ell} \;\Rightarrow\; \omega_r \in \mathcal{E}_{3,r}}$$

Covered rounds

Idea of the proof:

- ⋆ inductive proof: existence of “good” ℓ

Rounds for which we are able to exhibit a maximum-weight exponent.



Covered rounds

Idea of the proof:

- ⋆ inductive proof: existence of “good” ℓ
- ⋆ MILP solver (`PySCIPOpt`)

Rounds for which we are able to exhibit a maximum-weight exponent.



Plateau

Proposition

There is a plateau when $k_r = \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor = 1 \bmod 2$ and $k_{r+1} = \lfloor (r+1) \log_2 3 \rfloor = 0 \bmod 2$



Plateau

Proposition

There is a plateau when $k_r = \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor = 1 \bmod 2$ and $k_{r+1} = \lfloor (r+1) \log_2 3 \rfloor = 0 \bmod 2$



If we have a plateau

$$B_3^r = B_3^{r+1} ,$$

Then the next one is

$$B_3^{r+4} = B_3^{r+5}$$

or

$$B_3^{r+5} = B_3^{r+6} .$$

Music in MIMC_3

- Patterns in sequence $(\lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor)_{r>0}$: denominators of semiconvergents of

$$\log_2(3) \simeq 1.5849625$$

$$\mathfrak{D} = \{\boxed{1}, \boxed{2}, 3, 5, \boxed{7}, \boxed{12}, 17, 29, 41, \boxed{53}, 94, 147, 200, 253, 306, \boxed{359}, \ldots\} ,$$

$$\log_2(3) \simeq \frac{a}{b} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 2^a \simeq 3^b$$

- **Music theory:**
  - perfect octave 2:1
  - perfect fifth 3:2

$$2^{19} \simeq 3^{12} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 2^7 \simeq \left(\frac{3}{2}\right)^{12}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \quad \text{7 octaves} \sim \text{12 fifths}$$



Higher-Order differential attacks

Exploiting a low algebraic degree

For any affine subspace $\mathcal{V} \subset \mathbb{F}_2^n$ with $\dim \mathcal{V} \geq \deg^a(F) + 1$, we have a 0-sum distinguisher:

$$\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{V}} F(x) = 0.$$

Random permutation: degree $= n - 1$



(a) *Block cipher*



(b) *Random permutation*



Comparison to previous work

First Bound: $\lceil r \log_2 3 \rceil$ Exact degree: $2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil$.



Comparison to previous work

First Bound: $\lceil r \log_2 3 \rceil$ Exact degree: $2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil$.



For $n = 129$, $\text{MIMC}_3 = 82$ rounds

Rounds	Time	Data	Source
80/82	2^{128} XOR	2^{128}	[EGL+20]
81/82	2^{128} XOR	2^{128}	**New**
80/82	2^{125} XOR	2^{125}	**New**

Secret-key distinguishers ($n = 129$)

Take-Away

A better understanding of the algebraic degree of MiMC

- ⋆ guarantee on the degree of MIMC_3
  - ⋆ upper bound on the algebraic degree

$$2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil \; .$$

  - ⋆ bound tight, up to 16265 rounds
- ⋆ minimal complexity for higher-order differential attack

Take-Away

A better understanding of the algebraic degree of MiMC

- guarantee on the degree of MIMC_3
  - upper bound on the algebraic degree

$$2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil \ .$$

  - bound tight, up to 16265 rounds
- minimal complexity for higher-order differential attack

Missing exponents in the univariate representation

Take-Away

A better understanding of the algebraic degree of MiMC

- ⋆ guarantee on the degree of MIMC_3
  - ⋆ upper bound on the algebraic degree

$$2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil \ .$$

  - ⋆ bound tight, up to 16265 rounds
- ⋆ minimal complexity for higher-order differential attack

Missing exponents in the univariate representation

↓

Bounds on the algebraic degree

Take-Away

A better understanding of the algebraic degree of MiMC

- guarantee on the degree of MIMC_3
  - upper bound on the algebraic degree

$$2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil \ .$$

  - bound tight, up to 16265 rounds
- minimal complexity for higher-order differential attack

Missing exponents in the univariate representation

↓

Bounds on the algebraic degree → Higher-Order differential attacks

Take-Away

A better understanding of the algebraic degree of MiMC

- guarantee on the degree of MIMC_3
  - upper bound on the algebraic degree

$$2 \times \lceil \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor / 2 - 1 \rceil \ .$$

  - bound tight, up to 16265 rounds
- minimal complexity for higher-order differential attack

Missing exponents in the univariate representation → ???

↓

Bounds on the algebraic degree → Higher-Order differential attacks

Conclusions

- New tools for designing primitives:
  - `Anemoi`: a new family of ZK-friendly hash functions
  - a link between CCZ-equivalence and AO
  - more general contributions: `Jive`, `Flystel`

Conclusions

- New tools for designing primitives:
  - Anemoi: a new family of ZK-friendly hash functions
  - a link between CCZ-equivalence and AO
  - more general contributions: Jive, Flystel
- Practical and theoretical cryptanalysis
  - a better insight into the behaviour of algebraic systems
  - a comprehensive understanding of the univariate representation of MiMC
  - guarantees on the algebraic degree of MiMC

Perspectives

- ⋆ On the design
  - ⋆ a Flystel with more branches
  - ⋆ solve the conjecture for the linearity

Perspectives

- On the design
  - a Flystel with more branches
  - solve the conjecture for the linearity
- On the cryptanalysis
  - solve conjectures to trace maximum-weight exponents
  - generalization to other schemes
  - find a univariate distinguisher

Perspectives

- On the design
  - a Flystel with more branches
  - solve the conjecture for the linearity
- On the cryptanalysis
  - solve conjectures to trace maximum-weight exponents
  - generalization to other schemes
  - find a univariate distinguisher

Cryptanalysis and designing of arithmetization-oriented primitives remain to be explored!

Perspectives

- On the design
  - a `Flystel` with more branches
  - solve the conjecture for the linearity
- On the cryptanalysis
  - solve conjectures to trace maximum-weight exponents
  - generalization to other schemes
  - find a univariate distinguisher

Cryptanalysis and designing of arithmetization-oriented primitives remain to be explored!

Thank you

Anemoi

More benchmarks and Cryptanalysis

Sponge construction

- Hash function (random oracle):
  - input: arbitrary length
  - ouput: fixed length



New Mode: Jive

- Compression function (Merkle-tree):
  - input: fixed length
  - output: (input length) /2

Dedicated mode: 2 words in 1

$$(x, y) \mapsto x + y + u + v \ .$$





New Mode: `Jive`

- Compression function (Merkle-tree):
  - input: fixed length
  - output: (input length) /b

Dedicated mode: b words in 1

$$\texttt{Jive}_b(P) : \begin{cases} (\mathbb{F}_q^m)^b & \to \mathbb{F}_q^m \\ (x_0, \ldots, x_{b-1}) & \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^{b-1} (x_i + P_i(x_0, \ldots, x_{b-1})) \end{cases} .$$



Comparison for Plonk (with optimizations)

	m	Constraints
Poseidon	3	110
	2	88
Reinforced Concrete	3	378
	2	236
Rescue–Prime	3	252
Griffin	3	125
AnemoiJive	2	~~86~~ 56

(a) *With 3 wires.*

	m	Constraints
Poseidon	3	98
	2	82
Reinforced Concrete	3	267
	2	174
Rescue–Prime	3	168
Griffin	3	111
AnemoiJive	2	**64**

(b) *With 4 wires.*

Constraints comparison with an additional custom gate for x^α. ($s = 128$).

with an additional quadratic custom gate: 56 constraints

Native performance

Rescue-12	*Rescue*-8	Poseidon-12	Poseidon-8	Griffin-12	Griffin-8	Anemoi-8
15.67 μs	9.13 μs	5.87 μs	2.69 μs	2.87 μs	**2.59 μs**	4.21 μs

2-to-1 compression functions for $\mathbb{F}_p$ with $p = 2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$ ($s = 128$).

Rescue	Poseidon	Griffin	Anemoi
206 μs	**9.2 μs**	74.18 μs	128.29 μs

For $BLS12-381$, Rescue, Poseidon, Anemoi with state size of 2, Griffin of 3 ($s = 128$).

Algebraic attacks: 2 modelings



(a) *Model 1.* **(b)** *Model 2.*

Properties of `Flystel` in $\mathbb{F}_p$

⋆ Linear properties

$$\mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{H}} = \max_{a,b\neq 0} \left| \sum_{x\in\mathbb{F}_p^2} exp\left(\frac{2\pi i(\langle a,x\rangle - \langle b,\mathcal{H}(x)\rangle)}{p}\right)\right| \leq p\log p \text{ ?}$$



(a) *For different d.*



(b) *For the smallest d.*

Conjecture for the linearity.

Properties of `Flystel` in $\mathbb{F}_p$

⋆ Linear properties

$$\mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{H}} = \max_{a,b \neq 0} \left| \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_p^2} exp\left(\frac{2\pi i(\langle a, x \rangle - \langle b, \mathcal{H}(x) \rangle)}{p} \right) \right| \leq p \log p \ ?$$



(a) *when* $p = 11$ *and* $d = 3$. **(b)** *when* $p = 13$ *and* $d = 5$. **(c)** *when* $p = 17$ *and* $d = 3$.

LAT of $\texttt{Flystel}_p$.

Algebraic attacks

Trick for Poseidon



(a) *First two rounds.*



(b) *Overview.*

Trick for Rescue–Prime



(a) *First round.*



(b) *Overview.*

Attack complexity

RP	Authors claims	Ethereum claims	$\deg^u$	Our complexity
3	2^{17}	2^{45}	$3^9 \approx 2^{14.3}$	2^{26}
8	2^{25}	2^{53}	$3^{14} \approx 2^{22.2}$	2^{35}
13	2^{33}	2^{61}	$3^{19} \approx 2^{30.1}$	2^{44}
19	2^{42}	2^{69}	$3^{25} \approx 2^{39.6}$	2^{54}
24	2^{50}	2^{77}	$3^{30} \approx 2^{47.5}$	2^{62}

(a) *For* POSEIDON.

R	m	Authors claims	Ethereum claims	$\deg^u$	Our complexity
4	3	2^{36}	$2^{37.5}$	$3^9 \approx 2^{14.3}$	2^{43}
6	2	2^{40}	$2^{37.5}$	$3^{11} \approx 2^{17.4}$	2^{53}
7	2	2^{48}	$2^{43.5}$	$3^{13} \approx 2^{20.6}$	2^{62}
5	3	2^{48}	2^{45}	$3^{12} \approx 2^{19.0}$	2^{57}
8	2	2^{56}	$2^{49.5}$	$3^{15} \approx 2^{23.8}$	2^{72}

(b) *For Rescue–Prime.*

Cryptanalysis Challenge

Category	Parameters	Security level	Bounty
~~Easy~~	~~$N = 4, m = 3$~~	~~25~~	~~$2,000~~
Easy	$N = 6, m = 2$	25	$4,000
Medium	$N = 7, m = 2$	29	$6,000
Hard	$N = 5, m = 3$	30	$12,000
Hard	$N = 8, m = 2$	33	$26,000

(a) *Rescue–Prime*

Category	Parameters	Security level	Bounty
~~Easy~~	~~$r = 6$~~	~~9~~	~~$2,000~~
~~Easy~~	~~$r = 10$~~	~~15~~	~~$4,000~~
~~Medium~~	~~$r = 14$~~	~~22~~	~~$6,000~~
~~Hard~~	~~$r = 18$~~	~~28~~	$12,000
~~Hard~~	~~$r = 22$~~	~~34~~	$26,000

(b) *Feistel–MiMC*

Category	Parameters	Security level	Bounty
~~Easy~~	~~$\mathrm{RP} = 3$~~	~~8~~	~~$2,000~~
~~Easy~~	~~$\mathrm{RP} = 8$~~	~~16~~	~~$4,000~~
~~Medium~~	~~$\mathrm{RP} = 13$~~	~~24~~	~~$6,000~~
Hard	$\mathrm{RP} = 19$	32	$12,000
Hard	$\mathrm{RP} = 24$	40	$26,000

(c) POSEIDON

Category	Parameters	Security level	Bounty
Easy	$p = 281474976710597$	24	$4,000
Medium	$p = 72057594037926839$	28	$6,000
Hard	$p = 18446744073709551557$	32	$12,000

(d) `Reinforced Concrete`

Open problems

on the Algebraic Degree

Missing exponents when $d = 2^j - 1$

- For MIMC_3

$$i \bmod 8 \notin \{5, 7\} \ .$$

- For MIMC_7

$$i \bmod 16 \notin \{9, 11, 13, 15\} \ .$$

- For MIMC_{15}

$$i \bmod 32 \notin \{17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31\} \ .$$

- For MIMC_{31}

$$i \bmod 64 \notin \{33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63\} \ .$$



(a) *For* MIMC_3. **(b)** *For* MIMC_7.



(c) *For* MIMC_{15}. **(d)** *For* MIMC_{31}.

Proposition

Let $i \in \mathcal{E}_{d,r}$, where $d = 2^j - 1$. Then:

$$\forall\, i \in \mathcal{E}_{d,r},\ \ i \bmod 2^{j+1} \in \left\{0, 1, \ldots 2^j\right\} \ \cup\ \left\{2^j + 2\gamma, \gamma = 1, 2, \ldots 2^{j-1} - 1\right\} \ .$$

Missing exponents when $d = 2^j + 1$

- For MIMC_5
$$i \bmod 4 \in \{0, 1\} \ .$$
- For MIMC_9
$$i \bmod 8 \in \{0, 1\} \ .$$
- For MIMC_{17}
$$i \bmod 16 \in \{0, 1\} \ .$$
- For MIMC_{33}
$$i \bmod 32 \in \{0, 1\} \ .$$



(a) *For* MIMC_5.



(b) *For* MIMC_9.



(c) *For* MIMC_{17}.



(d) *For* MIMC_{33}.

Proposition

Let $i \in \mathcal{E}_{d,r}$ where $d = 2^j + 1$ and $j > 1$. Then:

$$\forall\, i \in \mathcal{E}_{d,r}, \ \ i \bmod 2^j \in \{0, 1\} \ .$$

Missing exponents when $d = 2^j + 1$ (first rounds)

Corollary

Let $i \in \mathcal{E}_{d,r}$ where $d = 2^j + 1$ and $j > 1$. Then:

$$\begin{cases} i \bmod 2^{2j} \in \{\{\gamma 2^j, (\gamma+1)2^j + 1\},\ \gamma = 0, \ldots r-1\} & \text{if } r \leq 2^j\ , \\ i \bmod 2^j \in \{0, 1\} & \text{if } r \geq 2^j\ . \end{cases}$$



(a) *Round 1* **(b)** *Round 2* **(c)** *Round 3* **(d)** *Round 4*



(a) *Round 5* **(b)** *Round 6* **(c)** *Round 7* **(d)** *Round $r \geq 8$*

Bounding the degree when $d = 2^j - 1$

Note that if $d = 2^j - 1$, then

$$2^i \bmod d \equiv 2^{i \bmod j} \ .$$

Proposition

Let $d = 2^j - 1$, such that $j \geq 2$. Then,

$$B_d^r \leq \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor - (\lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor \bmod j) \ .$$

Note that if $2 \leq j \leq 7$, then

$$2^{\lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor + 1} - 2^j - 1 > d^r \ .$$

Corollary

Let $d \in \{3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127\}$. Then,

$$B_d^r \leq \begin{cases} \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor - j & \text{if } \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor \bmod j = 0 \ , \\ \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor - (\lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor \bmod j) & \text{else} \ . \end{cases}$$

Bounding the degree when $d = 2^j - 1$

Particularity: Plateau when $\lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor \bmod j = j - 1$ and $\lfloor (r+1) \log_2 d \rfloor \bmod j = 0$.



Bound for MIMC_3



Bound for MIMC_7

Bounding the degree when $d = 2^j + 1$

Note that if $d = 2^j + 1$, then

$$2^i \bmod d \equiv \begin{cases} 2^{i \bmod 2j} & \text{if } i \equiv 0, \ldots, j \bmod 2j \ , \\ d - 2^{(i \bmod 2j) - j} & \text{if } i \equiv 0, \ldots, j \bmod 2j \ . \end{cases}$$

Proposition

Let $d = 2^j + 1$ s.t. $j > 1$. Then if $r > 1$:

$$B_d^r \leq \begin{cases} \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor - j + 1 & \text{if } \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor \bmod 2j \in \{0, j-1, j+1\} \ , \\ \lfloor r \log_2 d \rfloor - j & \text{else} \ . \end{cases}$$

The bound can be refined on the first rounds!

Bounding the degree when $d = 2^j + 1$

Particularity: There is a gap in the first rounds.



Bound for MIMC_5



Bound for MIMC_9

Sporadic Cases

Observation

Let $k_{3,r} = \lfloor r \log_2 3 \rfloor$. If $4 \leq r \leq 16265$, then

$$3^r > 2^{k_{3,r}} + 2^r \; .$$

Observation

Let t be an integer s.t. $1 \leq t \leq 21$. Then

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{Z}/3^t\mathbb{Z}, \; \exists \varepsilon_2, \ldots, \varepsilon_{2t+2} \in \{0,1\}, \text{ s.t. } x = \sum_{j=2}^{2t+2} \varepsilon_j 4^j \bmod 3^t \; .$$

Is it true for any t?

Should we consider more ε_j for larger t?

More maximum-weight exponents

r	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
$k_{3,r}$	1	3	4	6	7	9	11	12	14	15	17	19	20	22	23	25	26	28
$b_{3,r}$	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0



Study of MiMC_3^{-1}

Inverse: $F : x \mapsto x^s, \; s = (2^{n+1} - 1)/3 = [101..01]_2$

$$x \longrightarrow \boxed{x^s} \longrightarrow \overset{c_{r-1}}{\oplus} \longrightarrow \boxed{x^s} \longrightarrow \cdots \longrightarrow \overset{c_1}{\oplus} \longrightarrow \boxed{x^s} \longrightarrow y$$



First plateau

Plateau between rounds 1 and 2, for $s = (2^{n+1} - 1)/3 = [101..01]_2$

- Round 1:

$$B_s^1 = \mathrm{wt}(s) = (n+1)/2$$

- Round 2:

$$B_s^2 = \max\{\mathrm{wt}(is),\ \text{for } i \preceq s\} = (n+1)/2$$

Proposition

For $i \preceq s$ such that $\mathrm{wt}(i) \geq 2$:

$$\mathrm{wt}(is) \in \begin{cases} [\mathrm{wt}(i) - 1, (n-1)/2] & \text{if } \ wt(i) \equiv 2 \bmod 3 \\ [\mathrm{wt}(i), (n+1)/2] & \text{if } \ wt(i) \equiv 0, 1 \bmod 3 \end{cases}$$

Next Rounds

Proposition [Boura and Canteaut, IEEE13]

$\forall i \in [1, n-1]$, if the algebraic degree of encryption is $\deg^a(F) < (n-1)/i$, then the algebraic degree of decryption is $\deg^a(F^{-1}) < n - i$

$$r_{n-i} \geq \left\lceil \frac{1}{\log_2 3} \left(2 \left\lceil \frac{1}{2} \left\lceil \frac{n-1}{i} \right\rceil \right\rceil + 1 \right) \right\rceil$$

In particular:

$$\boxed{r_{n-2} \geq \left\lceil \frac{1}{\log_2 3} \left(2 \left\lceil \frac{n-1}{4} \right\rceil + 1 \right) \right\rceil}$$